By Christin Stühlen
The European Commission under Ursula von der Leyen has declared its goal of making Europe the first climate-neutral continent. The political initiatives bundled within the 2019 European Green Deal (EGD) framework include measures aimed at enabling various economic sectors—energy, transportation, industry, and agriculture—to grow while simultaneously combating climate change. The Commission's primary goal is a transition to a climate-neutral economy with net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. At first glance, this ambition is commendable: while many countries, such as the USA, are massively expanding fossil fuel production, Europe is dedicating itself to the fight against climate change. "No person nor region" is to be left behind in this process.
Not everyone shares this optimism. “Why are the conditions of the energy transition not being scrutinized more critically by the European and German left?” asks Svjetlana Nedimović, a member of the network Združeni balkanski otpor i rad/Zbor ("United Balkan Resistance and Labor Organization") and editor of the online magazine Riječ i djelo ("Word and Deed") from Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina. “It is clear that the EU is trying to save its industry. But it is doing so at the expense of peripheral regions—in the Global South and the Balkans.” These regions share a commonality: weak political structures that facilitate the exploitation of people and nature, making them attractive targets for European policies and international capital interests. Therefore, before discussing climate justice, she argues, we must address transnational social justice. So, is everything that glitters really green?
The Key to Climate Neutrality
To understand Nedimović’s critique, one must consider another tool of the Commission, which forms a central legal initiative of the EGD: the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA). Its stated goal is to ensure the European industry has a secure supply of raw materials necessary for the green transition —for instance, for the decarbonization of industry and the electrification of mobility. The EU aims to become not only climate-neutral but also economically strong. Raw materials are classified as “critical” and “strategic” when they are indispensable to specific industries and/or of particular strategic interest. Lithium, a key component of batteries needed for expanding electric mobility, is categorized as both critical and strategic.
Currently, 34 critical and 17 strategic raw materials are predominantly imported from outside the EU. For instance, 97% of the EU’s lithium supply comes from China. This poses a significant risk – specifically for the German economy and its automotive industry – as geopolitical tensions could disrupt access to lithium-powered batteries. The Russian invasion of Ukraine, conflicts with China, and the rise of right-wing forces in the USA are immense threats to European and German industries. To address this, the EU plans to allocate funds from 2025 for the development of 170 so-called “strategic projects” and aims to increase the share of “domestic” intra-European mining by 10% by 2030. Is the expansion of Europe’s mining industry subsequently a decisive step in achieving global climate justice – because raw materials would finally be extracted where they are consumed? Hardly so. Increased domestic mining does not necessarily mean a reduction of mining in the Global South. The CRMA sets no specific targets for an absolute reduction of raw material demand. While the EU aims to recycle about 25% of raw materials, the feasibility of this goal remains unclear. The EU primarily seeks to diversify its supply chains rather than significantly reduce its raw material consumption, it seems.
A Mine for Europe
When the German Chancellor recently traveled to Serbia, a strategic agreement on sustainable raw materials, battery value chains, and electric vehicles was on the agenda. The Australian mining company Rio Tinto plans to establish a lithium mine in Serbia and the deposit could supply the German car industry for decades. Additionally, vast deposits of lithium and other minerals, such as zinc, silver, and copper, are of interest in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the industrial town of Vareš, an approximately 800,000 tons of various critical and strategic raw materials are set to be extracted, particularly zinc. The British company Adriatic Metals then transports them to a Croatian port for shipment to European countries, primarily Germany.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and other Balkan countries are attractive to international mining companies due to their short transport routes, low concession fees, and low corporate taxes, enabling companies to pocket most of the profits. The flip side is less money for the affected communities where these raw materials are extracted.
That is not a new development. ‘We’ve been a mine for Europe for decades,’ says Svjetlana Nedimović half-jokingly. The hunt for raw materials in Bosnia has intensified with the European Green Deal. Many planned mining projects are linked to other forms of exploitation Bosnia has experienced over the years—from its harvested timber to extracted minerals and the profits that leave the country to the workers who leave Bosnia to offer their workforce on the German market. Places like Vareš, once upon a time – before the Bosnian war in 1992 – a dynamic industrial town, are often impoverished and abandoned. Now, the new mining projects are raising old capitalist imaginaries of prosperous industrial towns.
The Spiderweb of Bosnian Politics
Expanding the mining industry is attractive to nearly all political actors in Bosnia, despite the unequal distribution of profits. The post-war institutional framework established by the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement divides the country into three entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republika Srpska (RS), and the Brčko District, along with numerous cantons and municipalities. While political actors in the Federation lean towards the EU and the USA, the RS maintains close relations with the BRICS states, including Russia. Between these poles exist powerful local and regional players, with corruption running rampant. The highest formal authority in the country however is Christian Schmitt, a former German CSU agriculture minister who has held the office of the “High Representative” of Bosnia and Herzegovina since 2018. There is no doubt that he supports foreign investments and privatizations, including those in mining. The EU accession process, invigorated by the onset of the Ukraine war in 2022, has also pushed for economic liberalization, further accelerating mining expansion. But at what cost?
The costs of mining are not only high in the Global South but in everywhere political regulation is weak— including the Balkans. These costs range from groundwater pollution, increased fine particulate matter, and biodiversity loss to devastating impacts on human health. This is strongly illustrated by the alarming mortality rate due to air pollution in Bosnia, which is the fifth-highest worldwide and is being attributed to the dominance of the coal industry in the country. Approximately 3,300 people die prematurely each year as residents of mining areas are at a significantly higher risk of developing various diseases, especially cancer. This situation is not unique to Bosnia but affects other countries in the region as well.
The EU-led expansion of mining is often accompanied by the hope of “better” or more sustainable mining practices. The EU has made this hope a part of its marketing strategy: To distinguish itself from geopolitical rivals like China, European mining is to be “green.” The CRMA stipulates that strategic projects must meet “the highest possible environmental standards.” However, there are few studies that prove whether standards in Europe are actually higher than elsewhere. Reports indicate that mining in Europe, particularly in non-EU states, remains a dirty business, and supposedly strict environmental regulations are often not enforced in practice. Moreover, the CRMA includes accelerated approval processes to enable companies to implement their projects quickly. This timeline, critics fear, may preclude thorough environmental impact assessments that would forecast the consequences of mining projects on people and nature.
Struggles for a Just Energy Transition
The destructive dynamics of expanding mining industries are well-documented in the Global South, now they are continuing in Southeast Europe. However, resistance is growing. In Serbia, massive nationwide protests against lithium mining managed to (temporarily) halt the Rio Tinto project in 2021. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, weak political and legal structures often restrain political mobilization. Despite this, protests against planned or expanded mining projects are taking place in Bosnian villages, especially where residents’ livelihoods depend on agriculture.
The network Zbor, whose name derives from partisan assemblies in Yugoslavia during World War II, is actively fighting resource exploitation. It advocates for an energy transition that considers all exploited regions of the world—both in the South and the East. It’s not only active in Bosnia but across the entire region of former Yugoslavia—a region where solidarity has historically always been conceived as transnational. A striking example of this transnational spirit is the first meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961 in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, which laid the foundation for a movement based on global cooperation, independence, and anti-colonial solidarity.
In addition to its solidarity with struggles in the Global South, Zbor and its members are turning their attention to Germany, the German climate movement, and German trade unions. “Trade unions, in particular, should recognize that the EU pits the working classes of its centers against the interests of the southeastern European periphery. It’s clear that the EU is trying to save its industry. But to do so, it must mine resources in its backyard. This is shortsighted. If people can no longer live here, where will they go? Where will they offer their cheap labor?” asks Nedimović. Her appeal does not stop there: “The EU must be held accountable by civil society. All these new regulations need to be monitored and contextualized!”
The conclusion drawn from the political struggle of Zbor and Svjetlana Nedimović is clear: anyone advocating for a just energy transition cannot stop at demanding “green” energy. They must radically question Europe’s immense raw material consumption.
